

VZCZCXYZ0005  
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUNV #0055 0310957  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
P 310957Z JAN 08  
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7455  
INFO RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 0189

S E C R E T UNVIE VIENNA 000055

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR ISN/MNSA AND IO/T

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/30/2018  
TAGS: [IAEA](#) [KNPP](#) [AORC](#) [PARM](#) [IR](#) [IS](#)  
SUBJECT: IAEA/IRAN: ISRAEL IN THE DOG HOUSE WITH DG,  
ANXIOUS ABOUT IRAN REPORT

REF: A) UNVIE 37 AND PREVIOUS B) BRUSSELS 137

Classified By: Charge d'affairs Geoffrey R. Pyatt for  
reasons 1.4 b, d, h

¶1. (S) Israeli Ambassador Michaeli informed Nuclear Counselor January 30 that the GOI is in a "bad situation" with the DG. ElBaradei is refusing to meet with any representative of the current Israeli government with the exception of Michaeli, following an unauthorized remark on the part of an Israeli official calling for the DG's impeachment last fall. The DG recently turned down a meeting request from Israeli Atomic Energy Agency Director Gideon Frank who is still planning on coming to Vienna in the near future. Michaeli expected that Frank may dangle information on Syria in the hopes of getting the DG to change his mind. He also noted that much of the DG's "Al Hayat" interview earlier this month focused on Israel.

¶2. (S) Michaeli expressed deep anxiety about the DG's forthcoming report on Iran. He noted that the DG, now in the last two years of his tenure, is inclined to act more independently and is not consulting on the work plan. Michaeli was told by safeguards officials that the "general mood" was to close issues if it came down to a matter of judgment, rather than hard facts, though DDG Heinonen has assured him that he would be "much surprised" if all of the outstanding issues could be closed. Michaeli cited his discussions with Heinonen on the contamination issue as an example of back peddling. When Michaeli earlier proposed an explanation similar to the story Iran eventually gave the Secretariat, Heinonen dismissed it as "unreasonable." Now

SIPDIS

Heinonen claims he cannot say if Iran's story is true or untrue. Michaeli feared that the Secretariat is more inclined to accept an innocent explanation that is "not impossible" even if it is unreasonable. Michaeli had not shared these concerns with the DG but he noted that in a meeting with him the week of January 21 (shortly after the DG's return from Iran), ElBaradei refused to say the four-week deadline constituted a commitment, arguing that it may take more time depending on Iran's answers.

¶3. (S) Michaeli also told Nuclear Counselor that the IAEA representative in New York claims ElBaradei is convinced that if he can report the closure of all outstanding issues in the work plan, the Security Council process (which he never liked) would grind to a halt (septel reports comments from Heinonen which suggest such a whitewash is unlikely). Nuclear Counselor noted that the Secretariat seems to be trying to pin Iran down on the alleged studies and that the U.S. continues to provide the DG information to counteract any "plausible stories" Iran concocts. Were the DG prepared to declare the work plan "completed," he assured Michaeli

that the U.S. would make clear such an outcome was unacceptable. Michaeli agreed that the DG would probably not go that far but was concerned that the Board would adopt or take note of the DG's report no matter what. Nuclear Counselor noted that member states could decline to join consensus in noting such a report and that the Board could take its own action, such as a resolution. Meanwhile, Michaeli claimed that Iran is so convinced ElBaradei will clear them, they have kept Solana at an arms' length. He was unaware of the January 24 Jalili-Solana dinner in Brussels (ref b).

PYATT